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RESUMEN Hoy día los anuncios 
publicitarios nos inundan de forma tan 
abrumadora que captar la atención del 
receptor y mantenerla el tiempo 
suficiente para que el anuncio sea 
procesado en su totalidad se han 
convertido en objetivos esenciales para 
el publicista. El empleo de 
determinadas estrategias en el diseño 
de los anuncios contribuye eficazmente 
a la consecución de dichos objetivos, 
facilitando no sólo que la audiencia 
preste atención al estímulo sino 
también que lo procese de una forma 
determinada, favorable al publicista. 
Proponemos que la teoría de la 
Relevancia, un enfoque de la 
comunicación que se construye sobre 
una visión de la cognición como un 
sistema masivamente modular, ofrece 
las herramientas adecuadas para 
explicar la naturaleza de los procesos 
interpretativos en la comprensión 
verbal. El conocimiento de los 
procedimientos inferenciales reflexivos 
que intervienen en la interpretación de 
los enunciados permite al publicista 
prever el tipo de procesamiento que 
los receptores realizarán, dándoles la 
posibilidad de controlarlo de tal manera 
que determinados efectos 
interpretativos se recuperen de la 
forma prevista.
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Inférences réflexives dans la publicité
RÉSUMÉ Aujourd’hui les annonces 
publicitaires nous envahissent de tel 
manière que capter l’attention du 
récepteur et la maintenir le temps 
suffisant pour que l’annonce soit traité 
en sa totalité  se sont convertis en 
objectifs essentiels pour le publiciste. 
L’emploi de certaines stratégies dans la 
réalisation des annonces contribue 
efficacement à la réalisation de ces 
objectifs en facilitant non seulement 
que l’audience fasse attention au 
stimulus mais aussi qu’il le traite d’une 
manière déterminée, favorable au 
publiciste. Nous proposons que la 
théorie de la Pertinence, une approche 
de la communication qui se construit 
sur une vision de la cognition comme 
un système massivement modulaire, 
offre les outils pertinents pour expliquer 
la nature des processus interprétatifs 
dans la compréhension verbale. La 
connaissance des procédures 
inférentielles réflexives qui 
interviennent sur l’interprétation des 
énoncés permet au publiciste de 
prévoir le type de processus que les 
récepteurs réalisent en leur donnant la 
possibilité de le contrôler de façon que 
les différents effets interprétatifs 
répercutent de la manière envisagée.
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Reflexive inferences in advertising
ABSTRACT Advertisements are so 
ubiquitous nowadays that capturing the 
addressee’s attention and maintaining it 
long enough for them to be fully 
processed have become fundamental 
objectives for advertisers. Employing 
specific strategies in the design of the 
advertisement contributes efficiently to 
achieving these goals, getting the 
audience not only to attend the 
stimulus but also to process it in certain 
ways favourable for the advertiser. We 
argue that Relevance theory, an 
approach to communication built on a 
massively modular view of cognition, 
offers the right tools to explain the 
nature of the interpretative processes 
in verbal comprehension. Knowledge of 
the relevance-based reflexive 
inferential procedures involved in 
utterance interpretation allows 
advertisers to foresee the addressee’s 
processing behaviour, giving them the 
possibility to control it in a such a way 
that the intended interpretative effects 
are achieved in the desired way.
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1 Introduction
Advertising is an essential part of today’s society. Every day we are exposed to so 
many advertising messages in all kinds of format and through all sorts of medium 
that we have become used to them. According to the Media Dynamics publication, 
Media Ma!ers, the average adult is daily exposed to about 600 ads in any form 
(whether noticed or not), 272 of them coming from major traditional media (TV, 
newspapers, radio and magazines). Story (2007), from "e New York Times, cites 
Yankelovich, a market research firm, that estimates that a person living in a city 30 
years ago saw up to 2,000 ad messages a day, while today it is around 5,000 the 
advertisements we come across. !ese huge numbers represent more a problem than 
a benefit for advertisers as most of these ad messages, though very cleverly built, and 
ignored and go unnoticed, and if they manage to catch the audience’s a"ention they 
do not achieve to maintain it for a very long time. !e consequence is that addressees 
only process a very limited amount of the total number of advertisements they come 
through and this is a serious disadvantage for advertisers, who intend their messages 
to be fully recovered and remembered. As a result, gaining the reader’s a"ention on 
their advertisement and maintaining it long enough for it to be fully processed has 
become one of the main goals for advertisers. However, this is a very complicated 
objective, given that addressees have developed this kind of immunity to advertising 
stimuli and the messages communicated by them. 
One way around this problem is employing specific strategies in the design of the 
advertisements that contribute to success in ge"ing the audience not only to a"end 
the stimulus but also to process it in certain ways favourable for the advertiser. We 
argue that advertisers can foresee and control the addressee’s processing behaviour 
on the basis of the knowledge of how the human cognitive system and, more 
specifically, the verbal comprehension system, work. !is knowledge will give them 
the possibility of selecting the adequate stimuli which will capture the addressee’s 
a"ention in the first place, initiating in this way the interpretative process. It will 
also allow them to design the advertisement in such a way that the reader will be 
compelled to go ahead in the processing, proceeding through a series of carefully 
calculated steps.
Our aim in this paper is to argue that Relevance theory, a cognitive approach to 
communication and pragmatic interpretation, offers the right tools to explain how 
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the verbal comprehension procedure functions and how individuals can take 
advantage of this knowledge to communicate efficiently, with reference to the special 
circumstances of advertising. We start presenting an outline of the massive 
modularity view of the human cognitive system that underlies Relevance theory and 
its main implications for verbal comprehension. In the following section we analyse 
Sperber and Wilson’s proposal regarding the relationship between the mind reading 
ability and inferential comprehension, which is considered to be a modular process. 
Regularities unique to the domain of verbal comprehension relative to the human 
tendency to look or relevant information have led to the development of a 
mechanism which applied to the processing of ostensive stimuli. !is mechanism, 
the relevance-guided inferential comprehension procedure, accounts for how speaker’s 
meaning is recovered, and the kind of inferential processes involved in 
comprehension. In the following sections we discuss the fundamental role that 
reflexive inferences play in the interpretative process, showing how their 
computations, together with the limited access to background information that the 
verbal comprehension modular system has, can affect in a decisive way the resulting 
interpretation of a given stimulus. Knowledge of the relevance-oriented nature of 
human cognition and of the mechanisms involve in verbal comprehension makes it 
possible to predict and plan the way in which people will interact with the 
information they receive. 
2  Massive modularity and the verbal comprehension system
Relevance theory, as developed by Sperber & Wilson (1986, 1995), is one of the most 
a"ractive pragmatic analysis of human communication from a cognitive point of 
view. !ey start from the idea that pragmatic interpretation of u"erances is a 
cognitive activity which involves a number of inferential operations on mental 
representations, operations which are governed and guided by a single cognitive 
principle, the principle of relevance. 
!e theoretical foundations of Relevance theory can be found in the modular view 
of the human cognitive architecture proposed by Fodor (1983, 2000). On his view, 
there are two types of human cognitive systems: perceptual input systems, including 
language perception, which are properly modular, and central systems, responsible 
for forming beliefs and making decisions, which are properly inferential and 
nonmodular. Fodor lists a number of features that characterise modular systems, the 
most important and controversial being their domain specificity, according to which 
modules can only operate on specific kind of stimuli, and their informational 
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encapsulation, that refers to their limited access to information in specific databases 
to perform their computations.1
Fodor proposes that the language faculty is an autonomous module composed of 
different submodules (phonetic, phonological, lexical, semantic and syntactic) which 
behave in an autonomous, independent way, only accepting as input the output of 
the computations of preceding modules. In u"erance interpretation, the linguistic 
processing modular system acts in an initial phase, decoding the u"erance in an 
automatic, fast and encapsulated fashion. !en, a second phase follows, that of 
pragmatic interpretation, which is inferential, highly context sensitive and carried 
out by the central system that bridges the gap between the decoded meaning and the 
speaker’s intended meaning. Pragmatic inferences are special because, while 
modular processes have restricted access to contextual information, they are not 
limited on the type or source of contextual information they may use in their 
computations.
In the last years, evolutionary psychologists have put forward a different view of 
the human cognitive system which has brought about a revision of the concept of 
module as initially developed by Fodor. !ey propose that the cognitive architecture 
is massively modular, including the central systems responsible for higher level 
functions such as reasoning or belief fixation.2  Mercier & Sperber (2009) explain it as 
follows:
Massive modularists are neither monists nor dualists, they are pluralists. !ey see the 
human mind as made up of many specialised modules, each autonomous, each with a 
distinct phylogenetic and/or ontogenetic history, and each with its own input 
conditions, specific procedures, and characteristic outputs.        (150)
!e originality of this new conception is that a module is now characterised, not 
by a number of properties, but by the presence of specific, autonomous mechanisms 
which have developed to deal with regularities in specific domains (Sperber 1996, 
2001). For instance, Wilson (2003) explains how mind-reading, the ability that 
enables human beings to explain the behaviour of others in terms of mental states 
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1 Besides being informationally encapsulated and domain specific, modular systems are 
mandatory, stimulus driven, fast, produce shallow outputs, are inaccessible to consciousness, 
have fixed neural localization and present characteristic breakdown patterns. For a detailed 
explanation of each of these features see Fodor (1983: 43-101).
2 There is a variety of positions on modularity; from the minimal modularity proposed by 
Fodor (1983, 2000) to the massive modularity, the very extreme proposal defended by 
evolutionary psychologists (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Pinker, 1997; Sperber, 1994, 2001, 
2005). There are also a number of middle positions which propose a moderately massive 
modular view in which the mind contains modular as well as non-modular systems besides 
central systems (Carey & Spelke, 1994; Smith & Tsimpli, 1995; Carruthers, 1998, 2003; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 2001).
(intentions, beliefs, desires…), can be considered to be modular from this new 
perspective:
According to the classical version of the modularity thesis, mind-reading should be a 
central rather than a modular process because its outcome depends on global factors: 
there is no principled restriction on the type of contextual information that may be 
required to predict and explain someone’s actions. From an evolutionary perspective, 
the question is not so much whether the processes involved are global or local, but 
whether they are carried out by general purpose mechanisms or by autonomous, 
special-purpose mechanisms a"uned to regularities existing only in the domain of 
intentional behaviour. To the extent that mind-reading involves such special-purpose 
inferential mechanisms, it would be modular in this new, broader sense.     (306)
Cognitive modules, a sub-type of biological modules, are domain-specific, that is, 
they process specific inputs that meet specific conditions and inform the organism 
about them. A cognitive module has its own procedures and may also have a database 
of its own3 .
!e massive modularity thesis faces two problems that Sperber (2005) answers in 
detail. !e first one has to do with the informational encapsulation of modules. If 
modules are so restricted their computations must lack the flexibility and context-
sensitivity typical of higher central processes and would not have access to 
information from other modules necessary to perform their computations. However, 
the human mind is highly flexible; the context of cognitive processes is continuously 
changing because the output of those processes modify the context in which the next 
inputs are processed. All these contextual changes can be taken into account and be 
reflected in the computations performed by the human mind. Or, as Sperber (2005: 2) 
explains it in the case of verbal comprehension: “In verbal comprehension, for 
instance, the interpretation of every u"erance modifies the context in which the 
next u"erance is interpreted. Context-sensitivity is the ability to take this ever 
changing context into account.” !en informational encapsulation and context-
sensitivity can be combined in the following way. !e operations of a cognitive 
module are not directly influenced by what other modules are doing or by the 
information available to them. However, the different modules can influence one 
another indirectly; for instance, the outputs of a module’s operations can be the 
input to some other module. !us, in verbal comprehension, the pragmatic 
interpretation module gets part of its input from the output of the linguistic 
decoding module. !e restriction imposed by encapsulation relates to the point in 
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3 Some modules are innate while others are acquired. For instance, in the case of humans, 
most innate modules are learning modules (e.g. the language faculty) which function using 
environmental inputs to construct other modules (e.g. the grammar of a particular language). 
See Sperber (2005).
the process when information from other modules becomes available as while the 
module is working its operations cannot be affected in any way. 
!e second problematic property of modules is mandatoriness. Sperber (2005: 10) 
points out that if the module operations are automatically triggered by every input 
that meets its specific conditions then there would be a computational explosion and 
besides, it would also mean that “every input would be processed in the same way in 
every situation.” Sperber solves this problem distinguishing two senses in which a 
cognitive procedure can be mandatory. In a first sense, “a procedure is mandatory if, 
given the appropriate input, it will follow its course and produce its output whatever 
the rest of the mind/brain is doing” (Sperber, 2005: 10). In a second sense, a 
procedure is “mandatory” or involuntary if it cannot be voluntarily willed or 
blocked”(Sperber, 2005: 11). When Fodor claims that the operations of the modules 
are mandatory he means that they are both, automatically input-triggered and 
involuntary. But Sperber defends that both properties do not necessarily go 
together.4  !e operations of input modules are mandatory only when the stimulus is 
and stays long enough at fixation, and the processor is not actively a"ending some 
other stimulus. A stimulus could be well within the field or perception and not be 
processed by the module for different reasons: because it has not received enough 
a"ention, or other stimuli are being processed at the time, etc. Mental modules in 
the human cognitive system compete for energetic resources and, according to 
Sperber (2005), the context-sensitivity of the system is shown in the way energy is 
allocated among modules. It is easy that a number of modules, all at once, have inputs 
available for processing and, as resources are limited and not all of them can 
function simultaneously, they have to compete for brain power to process them. 
Although the appropriate input may initially activate specific modular procedures 
they may not run their full course due to ‘ina"entional blindness, that is, to the 
receiver’s a"ention being focussed on something else.5  Energy distribution for 
modular processing will be effected via some kind of flexible, context-sensitive 
procedure in such a way that it contributes positively to the efficiency of the human 
cognitive system as a whole. 
Humans are continuously monitoring the environment and establishing contact 
with many potential inputs for further processing. But new inputs must be 
processed in the light of information already stored in the individual’s memory and 
this process has a cost which must find its compensation, as Sperber (2005) explains:
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4 There are many procedures, not under the voluntary control of the individual, which can 
be inhibited and boosted by internal factors (for instance, expectations) or external factors 
(distracting stimuli). See Sperber (2005) for examples.
5 Very striking experimental evidence of this “inattentional blindness” can be found in 
Simons & Chabris (1999). They used in their experiment a number of videos to prove that we 
only perceive and remember those objects that receive focused attention. Some of the 
videos they used can be watched at <http://viscog.beckman.illinois.edu/flashmovie/15.php>.
A"ending to a given stimulus, activating memorised information, bringing the two 
together and drawing inferences are effort-demanding mental activities. Effort is a cost 
that should be incurred only in the expectation of a benefit. Different trains of thought 
involve quite different evolving allocations of efforts and may produce quite different 
cognitive benefits.                  (13-14)
Cognitive efficiency is a ma"er of investing effort in processing the right inputs. 
!e question is how the mind selects them. Well, according to Sperber & Wilson 
(1995), a"ending to their relevance, a property of inputs to cognitive processes 
defined in terms of the cognitive benefits that the system can obtain from processing 
the input and the processing cost involved in the procedure. !e brain is optimistic 
about its own procedures and, in making decisions regarding the allocation of its 
processing resources, the mind is guided by expected effects and expected effort. 
Obviously there is no guarantee of how the processing will evolve. Different inputs 
may initially activate specific modular procedures which then compete for the 
required energy resources to complete their action. If the system decides that one of 
the inputs has the highest level of expected relevance then resources could be re-
allocated to the processing of that specific input. 
A consequence of this mode of functioning is that we do not choose the stimuli we 
a"end to, the stimuli we process, or the kind of procedures we apply to them. Not at 
least in the initial stages of the cognitive operations. We behave in specific ways 
because it is in-built in the innate design of our cognitive system. As Wilson (2003) 
states:
As a result of constant selection pressure towards increasing efficiency, the human 
cognitive system has developed in such a way that our perceptual mechanisms tend 
automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval 
mechanisms tend automatically to activate potentially relevant contextual 
assumptions, and our inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process them in 
the most productive way.                 (315)
!is idea is reflected in the First, Cognitive Principle of Relevance which, according 
to Sperber & Wilson (1995: 262), governs the functioning of human cognition: 
“Human cognition tends to be organised so as to maximise relevance.” Relevance, 
they claim, is a property of defined in terms of cognitive effects and processing 
effort. !at human cognition is naturally relevance-oriented means that the 
cognitive operations carried out by it will aim at the processing of the input in the 
most productive way in terms of effects obtained and processing effort demanded. 
!us, a"ention and processing resources are automatically allocated to information 
that seems relevant enough to be worth processing.
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3 Mind-reading, utterance interpretation
and the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure
Sperber & Wilson (1995) defend that human communication is also governed by the 
search of relevance; human beings only pay a"ention to that information that seems 
relevant to them. Every act of overt communication is an act of ostension and, as 
such, it involves the use of a stimulus which, by a"racting the audience’s a"ention, 
will trigger expectations of relevance that will guide the audience in the recovery of 
the communicator’s intended meaning. !is is what Sperber & Wilson (1995: 260) 
call the Second, Communicative principle of Relevance: “Every act of ostensive 
communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.” !us, 
the principle of relevance governs the inferential processes of pragmatic 
interpretation and helps the audience to select and build a single plausible 
interpretative hypothesis for the u"erance. 
Sperber & Wilson (2002) view inferential comprehension as falling within the 
domain of an intuitive ‘theory of mind’ module. Understanding an u"erance is a 
special case of understanding intentional behaviour, a process carried out by means 
of the mind-reading ability which enables humans to predict and explain people’s 
behaviour in general, and more specifically the recognition of speaker’s intentions in 
communication.
Traditionally mind reading has been classified as a central, non-modular process 
involving the application of general reasoning abilities. However, recently, evidence 
has been found that suggests that it could be a modular process which depends on 
special-purpose, inferential mechanisms which have developed in tune with the 
regularities in the domain of intentional behaviour.6 In the light of this new evidence 
Sperber & Wilson (2002) have modified their initial position and defend the idea that 
pragmatic interpretation is a specialized module: 
[…] pragmatic interpretation is not simply a ma"er of applying Fodorian central 
systems or general mind-reading abilities to a particular (communicative) domain. 
Verbal comprehension presents special challenges, and exhibits certain regularities, 
not found in other domains. It therefore lends itself to the development of a dedicated 
comprehension module with its own particular principles and mechanisms.   (5)
Pragmatic interpretation is domain-specific as it can only be applied to the 
interpretation of ostensive stimuli, that is, stimuli that have been produced with the 
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6 There are clear dissociations between mind-reading and general reasoning abilities. For 
instance, people with Williams Syndrome have strong mind-reading and communicative 
abilities but poor general reasoning abilities. And the opposite: people with Asperger’s 
syndrome may have very poor mind-reading abilities and very good general reasoning 
abilities. Both facts suggest that mind-reading depends on dedicated inferential mechanism 
that may remain intact while reasoning abilities are impaired and the other way round.
intention of making mutually manifest to the audience and speaker that he/she has 
the intention to communicate something to the audience. !us, the relevance-based 
comprehension module cannot be activated by non-communicative, non-ostensive 
stimuli. Pragmatic interpretation, at least to some extent, is also encapsulated as, for 
instance, the existence of pragmatic illusions seem to suggest.7  Under this view 
inferential comprehension is considered to be an intuitive, unreflective, modular 
process which takes place below the level of consciousness and whose operations are 
constrained by the principle of relevance. 
!e verbal comprehension submodule differs from the general mind-reading 
module in two ways: first, in the complexity of the metarepresentations involved in 
inferential comprehension and second in the sort of regularities in its domain. First, 
the verbal comprehension may involve several levels of metarepresentation and so, 
different levels of complexity (Sperber 1994, 1996, 2000). In a communicative act the 
idea activated in the receiver’s mind and the message finally inferred are normally 
very different. !e idea is merely a trigger for the identification of the speaker’s 
meaning via the recognition of his/her communicative intentions. 8
And second, the mind-reading module can exploit the regularities in intentional 
behaviour to develop certain inferential procedures to function only in those 
domains, procedures which will be special in the case of the verbal comprehension 
submodule as it presents regularities unique to its domain. !ese regularities have to 
do with the Cognitive principle of relevance, that is, with the natural tendency of 
humans to look for relevant information, and how it gets reflected in communication 
through the development of a dedicated inferential procedure: the relevance-guided 
inferential comprehension procedure for ostensive stimuli. 
!e relevance-guided inferential comprehension procedure is a dedicated 
inferential mechanism which functions with an in-built tendency for considerations 
of relevance. When a speaker engages in ostensive communication and produces an 
u"erance, he does so with the intention that his/her receiver finds the stimulus 
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7 Carston (1997:47) comments the following example taken from a lecture by Wilson (1996): 
No head injury is too trivial to ignore, which we wrongly understand as meaning “all head 
injuries should be attended to”, the opposite of what the semantics of the utterance indicate 
(”all head injuries are trivial and should be ignored”). The curious fact is that if the same 
utterance is reprocessed the same incorrect interpretation arises again in the first place, even 
having already worked out the correct meaning. Carston (1997) mentions that, although there 
is not a clear explanation of what is happening in the example, it is interesting how there is a 
persistent limitation on the access to the information that could help the receiver to process 
the utterance correctly.
8 According to Sperber (1994) there are three interpretative strategies the receiver could 
adopt: a naïve optimistic, a cautious optimistic and a sophisticated strategy. All these 
strategies involve the ability of the part of the hearer to deal with different levels of higher 
order intentions. See Sperber (1994) and Wilson (2000) for a deep analysis of each of these 
strategies.
relevant enough to be worth his/her a"ention. !us, every u"erance conveys a 
presumption of its own relevance; this is the Second, Communicative Principle of 
relevance and, as Sperber & Wilson (1995: 270) claim, the key to inferential 
comprehension:
Presumption of optimal relevance (revised)
(a) !e ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee’s effort to 
process it. 
(b) !e ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the 
communicator’s abilities and preferences. 
!e presumption of optimal relevance is built into our verbal comprehension 
system and this is why the relevance comprehension procedure is automatically used 
in interpreting the speaker’s meaning. Sperber & Wilson (2002:14) explain how it 
works:
Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure
(a) Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects. In particular, test 
interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) 
in order of accessibility.
(b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.
!e interpretative process begins with the recovery, by the semantics module, of 
the linguistically encoded meaning. In most cases, this will correspond to an 
incomplete and fragmentary semantic representation, so the hearer will have to 
develop it into a full-fledge semantic representation, that is, the complete 
propositional form of the u"erance. A few subtasks may be necessary in this process: 
disambiguation, reference assignment, enrichment and the recovery of ellided 
elements. !e hearer expects the speaker to have made his/her u"erance as relevant 
as possible, that is, relevant in terms of content and accessibility and this expectation 
justifies the hearer following a path of least effort in the interpretative process. So, 
the first interpretation coming to his/her mind will be the one intended by the 
speaker and will satisfy his/her expectations of relevance. For instance, the 
u"erance may contain a lexically ambiguous element and different interpretations 
could be accessible to the hearer. In that case the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
procedure will prompt the hearer to choose the first one to come to his/her mind, 
because it will be the only one that produces the relevant effects without pu"ing 
him/her to extra processing effort. 
Once the complete propositional form of the u"erance has been built, if 
necessary, the hearer will then enrich this representation at the explicit level and 
will complement it at the implicit level until the interpretation he recovers meets his 
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expectations of relevance. In summary, this inferential relevance-oriented procedure 
will be automatically applied to the on-line processing of a"ended stimuli to 
construct a hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning on the basis of the information 
in the u"erance and available contextual information which is highly activated at the 
time. !e kind and nature of the inferential processes employed in comprehension is 
the topic of the next section.
4 Inferences in verbal comprehension 
Experimental research in reasoning and decision making suggests that reasoning 
involves two mental systems or be"er, two kinds of mental processes.9  Type 1 
reasoning, a fast, automatic and mostly unconscious process which relies on fast and 
frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer, Todd and ABC Research Group, 1999) and produces 
effortless conclusions that are generally correct and appropriate in most se"ings. In 
this kind of reasoning intuitive inferences take place without a"ention to reasons for 
accepting them. And Type 2 reasoning, which is slow, consciously controlled and 
effortful (Evans & Over, 1996). In everyday human thinking, any of those processes of 
reasoning could be activated depending on the task, the context and the individual. 10
Mercier & Sperber (2009:155-156), in line with this proposal, establish a 
distinction between intuitive inference and reflective inference or reasoning proper.11
!ere is thus, within a massive-modularist framework, a subtle but unambiguous 
way to distinguish two categories of inferences: intuitive inferences the conclusion 
of which are the direct output of all inferential modules (including the 
argumentation module), and reflective inferences the conclusions of which are an 
indirect output embedded in the direct output the argumentation module. Since 
reflective inferences involve the representation of reasons, they well deserve the 
name of reasoning proper.
So, according to them the cognitive system delivers intuitive inferences through 
its many component subsystems, inferences that are reliable in most cases; it is only 
that one of these subsystems, the argumentation module, besides directly delivering 
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9 There is much evidence in favour of such a dual view of reasoning. However, as it is not 
completely clear how these two systems should be characterized, Evans (2008) proposes 
talking about Type 1 and Type 2 processes rather than System 1 and System 2. See Evans 
(2003), Evans & Over (1996), Osman (2004) and Sloman (1996). 
10 It seems that the ability for Type 2 processes or reasoning proper varies depending on 
the individual. See Stanovich & West (2000).
11 Mercier & Sperber (2009) argue: “We defend the hypothesis that the main function of 
reflective inference is to produce and evaluate arguments occurring in interpersonal 
communication (rather than to help individual ratiocination). This function, we claim, helps 
explain important aspects of reasoning.” (150)
intuitive reflexive inferences, also delivers indirectly reflective inferences, which are 
mainly produced on occasions when the individual has to decide on the reliability of 
the communicated information.12
!e intuitive, reflexive inferences that modules draw are heuristic in character, 
as Carruthers (2006) explains:
For example, rather than searching exhaustively through all the information in its 
proprietary database, a module might adopt the satisfying heuristic of stopping search 
when it has found an item of information that is good enough for use in its current task. 
Likewise, a modularist might accept that simple heuristics play a role in orchestrating 
the interactions amongst modules and their influence upon behaviour. Similarly, 
believers in simple heuristics could surely accept that at least some of the processes 
that issue in belief or that lead to a decision are modular in character.     (8-9)
Sperber & Wilson (1995) view inferential comprehension as an intuitive, 
unreflective modular process which takes place in an automatic way. If the 
relevance-based inferential procedure is to contribute to cognitive efficiency, it must 
be seen as “providing special-purpose inferential procedures (’fast and frugal 
heuristics’, in the terms of Gigerenzer, Todd and ABC Research Group 1999) a"uned 
to regularities in some particular domain, which yield reliable conclusions only 
when applied to input from this domain” (Wilson 2003: 311). Reflective inferences, or 
proper reasoning would only occur when spontaneous inferences of this kind fail to 
yield a satisfactory interpretation. 
What are those fast and frugal heuristics that Wilson mentions? How do they 
work? Gigerenzer, Todd and ABC Research Group (1999) develop a proposal about 
heuristics as cognitive mechanisms by which humans make decisions very quickly 
and efficiently on the basis of very li"le information. Heuristics are fast and frugal, 
and they are reliable enough to be worth having. A very clear example of frugality is 
the recognition heuristic (Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group 1999 and 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002): if asked to decide which of two objects has a higher 
value on some criterion people will choose the one they recognize. Or the Take the 
Best heuristic, in which the system decides between two alternatives just taking into 
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12 The argumentative module, that is, reasoning, has basically a primarily social function and 
has to do with human reliance on communicated information which can be positive but also 
negative, as it can lead to deception or misinformation. To be protected from this danger, 
humans have developed epistemic vigilance mechanisms which filter communicated 
information so that only that information which appears to be reliable is accepted. Some of 
these mechanisms evaluate the source of information considering whether they trust the 
speaker or not, and some of them evaluate the information itself, checking its coherence 
against his own knowledge base (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). So, reflective inference is 
basically employed when dealing with specific problems related to the acceptance or not of 
communicated assumptions.
consideration the most valid cue which is the first to discriminate between the 
alternatives. Or the Take the Last heuristic, in which the system decides between the 
alternatives using the cue which has most recently been used to decide between the 
alternatives. Heuristics like these can work as well as the most complex procedure, 
but in a frugal, economical way, both, in terms of the amount of information involved 
and in terms of processing complexity.
If the operations of the verbal comprehension module are to contribute to 
cognitive efficiency then they have to be frugal, and then there are two conditions 
that should be fulfilled. First, information frugality which establishes that there must 
be a limit on the amount of information the system has to consider before making a 
decision. Information frugality has to do with encapsulation: either the module 
cannot access stored information while it is working (wholly encapsulated system) 
or it can only access a limited database of information relevant to the actual 
procedure being performed. !ese two possibilities correspond to the distinction 
between the input to the module and the processing database of the module (Sperber 
2001; Carruthers 2003, 2006). And second, processing frugality, which controls the 
complexity of the algorithms the system has to execute in order not to require an 
excessive amount of time or working memory13. 
!e language comprehension module and the relevance-based inferential 
procedure are heuristic processes that make decisions on the selection of specific 
contextual assumptions relying on their relevance and validity for the interpretative 
process (very similar to the Take the Best heuristic), on the salience of a given piece of 
information in a context, or the accessibility of that information because it has been 
recently processed (very similar to the Take the Last heuristic). A procedure that 
works with spontaneous, reflexive inferences or heuristics differs from a procedure 
that works with reflective inferences or reasoning procedures in two main aspects. 
!e first one has to do with the number of steps involved in the inferential process: 
just one in the case of spontaneous inference and several in the case of reflective 
inference. And the second one, which derives from the first one, relates to the 
a"entional requirements and the concentration effort needed to maintain long 
enough an expectation of relevance strong enough to keep the module working while 
other modules are competing for the energetic resources. So, in summary, the 
relevance based comprehension procedure works drawing reflexive, spontaneous 
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13 Carruthers (2006) explains as follows the relationship between simple heuristics and 
massive modularists: “For example, rather than searching exhaustively through all the 
information in its proprietary database, a module might adopt the satisfying heuristic of 
stopping search when it has found an item of information that is good enough for use in its 
current task. Likewise, a modularist might accept that simple heuristics play a role in 
orchestrating the interactions amongst modules and their influence upon behaviour. Similarly, 
believers in simple heuristics could surely accept that at least some of the processes that 
issue in belief or that lead to a decision are modular in character.” (8-9).
inferences because it is an economical, fast way of constructing interpretations of 
u"erances which are on most occasions correct. 
5  Controlling and calculating the interpretative process 
According to Sperber & Wilson (1995) the human cognitive system is relevance-
oriented, that is, we look for relevant information, information that is likely to 
interact positively with our mental representation of the world. !e knowledge of 
how the human cognitive system functions, and more specifically, of how the 
comprehension system behaves gives speakers the possibility to predict and control 
the mental states of others and the way in which they will interact with the 
information they receive. !us, as Sperber & Wilson (2002) explain:
!e universal cognitive tendency to maximise relevance makes it possible, at least to 
some extent, to predict and manipulate the mental states of others. In particular, an 
individual A can o%en predict:
(c) which stimulus in an individual B’s environment is likely to a"ract B’s a"ention 
(i.e. the most relevant stimulus in that environment);
(d) which background information from B’s memory is likely to be retrieved and used 
in processing this stimulus (i.e. the background information most relevant to 
processing it);
(e) which inferences B is likely to draw (i.e. those inferences which yield enough 
cognitive benefits for B’s a"entional resources to remain on the stimulus rather 
than being diverted to alternative potential inputs competing for those resources).
(14)
Consequently, the regularity described in the Cognitive and Communicative 
principle of relevance, that is, the relevance-oriented nature of human cognition, is 
in-built in our general mind-reading ability and, more specifically, in the verbal 
comprehension sub-module. !is, together with the fact that the three processes 
above are governed in their functioning by considerations of relevance, makes it 
very easy for speakers to foresee how hearers’ thoughts will flow: the kind of stimuli 
that will get their a"ention, the items of knowledge in their memory device that will 
be activated to play a part in the process and the inferences the hearer will draw 
when processing the stimulus against the background assumptions retrieved. If 
employed efficiently, this knowledge will help speakers in their communicative 
a"empts, guiding the addressee through a comprehension process carefully 
designed to reach a specific end. 
A factor that plays a fundamental role in the interpretation process is the 
recognition of the speaker’s intention in the communicative act. Sperber and Wilson 
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(1995) have argued that the relevance-based theoretic procedure is domain-specific 
and it is only activated by ostensive stimuli, that is, stimuli that have been 
intentionally produced by the communicator with the intention that the addressee 
recognizes this intention and uses it as a basis to recover the speaker’s meaning and 
infer some specific conclusions from it. Very frequently advertising has been defined 
as the typical case of covert communication (Dyer 1982; Tanaka 1994; Forceville 1996; 
Fuertes Olivera, Velasco-Sacristán, Arribas-Baño & Samaniego-Fernández 2001; 
Crook 2004). It cannot be denied that advertisers very o%en have hidden intentions 
and, by communicating covertly, they try to avoid the possible negative effects of 
having their intentions recognised. !e interpretative process of covert 
communication is not explained by the relevance-based comprehension procedure 
because in these cases there are no communicative intentions that carry a 
presumption of optimal relevance to guide the process. However, advertisers do not 
always have hidden intentions and there are many instances of advertising acts in 
which the recognition of the advertiser’s communicative intentions plays a 
fundamental role in the interpretative process, especially when the intended 
interpretation is not as straightforward as it would have been in normal 
communicative acts.
Take for instance the following advertisement which is an example of garden-
path interpretation:
(1) A%er a visit to the tropic we packed our bags
   HEATH AND HEATHER 
    Tropical Fruit Herbal Teas       (Cosmopolitan, July 1992)
!e reader may initially access the following interpretation:
(2) A%er a visit to the tropic we packed out baggage.
but as soon as he reaches the final part of the advertisement that interpretation will 
be abandoned in favour of one in which bags is interpreted as tea bags. We can argue 
that although the interpretation initially constructed is not the final interpretation it 
is in fact intended by the speaker, who also intends the audience to recognise this 
intention. 
It is difficult to maintain that the advertiser is trying to communicate a set of 
assumptions covertly, without the addressee realizing he is doing so. It is a 
fundamental part of the interpretative process that the advertiser intends the 
addressee to construct an initial interpretation that has to be abandoned very soon. 
!is assumption, that the advertiser has this intention, is one of the set of contextual 
assumptions employed in the interpretative process, and part of the background 
knowledge the addressee holds about the source of the message and advertisers in 
general.
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So, we want to argue that in cases like the one above the addressee employs a 
cautious strategy to recover a relevant enough interpretation that is not the first one 
to come to his mind, but the one the speaker might have intended to communicate. In 
these cases the speaker is assumed to be benevolent and also competent, and the 
‘mistake’ in the interpretation process is not due to a miscalculation on the part of 
the advertiser of the resources available to the addressee, but a carefully planned and 
calculated process. !e advertiser not only manages to convey relevant information, 
but he also does so in a very special way, making different interpretations accessible 
at different times in the process.
6  Reflexive inferences and the relevance-based interpretation procedure
According to Sperber & Wilson (1995), the verbal comprehension procedure, which is 
automatically applied to the online processing of verbal stimuli, will start with the 
recovery of a linguistically encoded semantic representation(s), usually fragmentary 
and incomplete, that will be later developed into a single, full propositional form of 
the u"erance on the basis of available contextual information. Both, the 
propositional form of an u"erance and its contextual effects are recovered by means 
of inferential processes of an intuitive, unreflective nature which mostly take place 
below the level of consciousness. Later, if necessary, the addressee will enrich this 
representation at the explicit level and/or the implicit level until the interpretation 
he recovers meets his expectations of relevance. !e final interpretation of an 
u"erance will be then a combination of the explicit content expressed by it and the 
set of contextual effects it gives rise to when processed in a specific, intended 
context. 
In order to recover the complete propositional form of the u"erance, the 
relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure may have to perform a series of 
inferential subtasks on the basis of the information linguistically decoded and the set 
of contextual background assumptions active at the time. So, it may be necessary to 
resolve ambiguities, assign reference, supply ellided elements or enrich certain 
expressions that need their meaning to be fully specified. In all these processes, and 
according to the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, the addressee will 
consider interpretative hypothesis in order of accessibility, the most accessible one 
being the least effort demanding, and will stop when his/her expectancies of optimal 
relevance are satisfied. In normal circumstances, all these sub-tasks will be carried 
out through reflexive, spontaneous inferential processes as well14.
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14 Even the recovery of implicit content, a process traditionally considered to be reflective, 
can be explained along the same lines. Sperber & Wilson (2002) comment that even Grice 
“might not have been averse to a modularised implementation of his approach, in which the 
recovery of implicatures was treated as an intuitive rather than a reflective process.” (10)
Two factors are crucial in the performance of these reflexive inferences (Iza & 
Esquerra 2000). !e first one is a!entional focus, a kind of working memory 
containing representations that are important in the current processing and will 
have a very high degree of accessibility in the interpretative process. !e activation 
of these representations could be due to the presence of a given stimulus in the 
physical environment at the time of the processing, for instance, in the pictures 
accompanying the slogan. Or it could be due to the presence in the u"erance of some 
lexical element which activates and brings to a"ention certain concepts that will be 
essential in the process. And the second factor to be taken into account is the 
addressee’s knowledge of the world about the information in the stimulus and the role 
it plays in the inferences to be made. Advertisers can take advantage of their 
knowledge of how these reflexive inferences function, when they are drawn, and 
why the verbal comprehension system employs them. 
As addressees cannot consciously decide to activate the information processing 
modules, the first task of the advertiser will be to design an ostensive stimulus 
relevant enough to start this process; that is, to get the addressee’s a"ention and 
maintain it long enough to increase the probability of the advertisement being fully 
processed. Different techniques serve to catch the reader’s a"ention: it has been 
proved useful to employ stimuli (verbal or non-verbal) that are pleasant, personally 
relevant to the intended audience, surprising, unexpected, or humorous.15  Once the 
ostensive stimulus has caught the reader’s a"ention, the second and most important 
aim is maintaining it long enough for the advertisement to be processed; in other 
words, winning the competition among modules for cognitive resources to be 
applied to the interpretation of that specific stimulus.16
Advertisers can design their advertisements in such a way that they are subjected 
to an automatic, spontaneous pragmatic processing, which will end up with the 
recovery of an initial interpretation that will not satisfy the addressee’s expectations 
of relevance. At some stage, the cognitive, in-built tendency to optimal relevance will 
‘force’ the addressee to reprocess the u"erance in his search for an interpretation 
that justifies his expectations of relevance; the one the advertiser intended to 
communicate. Obviously, reprocessing involves an increase in the effort necessary to 
arrive at the intended interpretation. However, as Sperber & Wilson (1995) claim, the 
concept of effort is relative to the benefits resulting in the process and, as far as this 
is a preplanned situation, very carefully calculated by the advertiser, we can expect a 
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15 For different techniques see Barry (1997), Dyer (1982), Lineros Quintero (1998), Messari 
(1997), Sutherland & Sylvester (2000) and Vestergaard & Schroder (1985).
16  As Mercier & Sperber (2009) explain: “‘Attention’ refers to the dynamic selection of some 
of the available information from the environment and from memory for deeper processing. 
From a modularist point of view, attentional selection might be best seen, not as the output of 
a distinct attention mechanism allocating resources to specific modules, but as the result of a 
process of competition for such resources among modules” (151).
compensation for the extra effort involved. !us, the fact that the addressee has to 
reprocess will be reflected not only in the kind of interpretative process that is 
finally carried out, but in the set of contextual effects the interpretative process will 
give rise to.
Consider the following advertisement:
(3)   Now you can do the wash without the wear
   Improved Tide keeps clothes looking more like new
 (Good Housekeeping, September 1994)
!e first step in the interpretative process will be the decoding of the different 
semantic representations of the u"erance. !e relevance-based inferential 
procedure will then select one of these representations and will develop it into the 
complete propositional form of the u"erance. One of the sub-tasks that the 
relevance-based procedure performs in this process is the disambiguation of the 
word wear, which is carried out by drawing a reflexive inference on the basis of 
available contextual information. !is set of assumptions in the database of the 
module is a subset of the total information base the module could have looked at. Any 
information in this main database could have been automatically selected to be 
included in this subset if it had been made salient, or highly accessible at the time of 
the processing. !ose elements recently processed in the u"erance enjoy this special 
accessibility, and will be part of this momentarily-existing database of the relevance-
based procedure. For instance, the word wash will make highly accessible the sense 
clothes of the ambiguous word wear because it is regularly used in connection with 
this concept. So, the relevance-based procedure, by means of a reflexive, 
spontaneous inference, will select and develop an initial interpretation on the basis 
of this sense:
(4)   Now you [the reader] can do the wash without the ‘clothes’.
!e addressee will continue processing the rest of the advertisement which reads as 
follows:
(5)   Improved Tide keeps clothes looking more like new.
and new items of information will be made available from the concepts in the 
u"erance itself, the assumptions they activate in the database of the system, and the 
concepts activated in the u"erance or u"erances he has just processed. !ese new 
assumptions will be part of a second, momentarily-existing database against which a 
second interpretation will be recovered:
 
(6)   Now you [the reader] can do the wash without the clothes deteriorating.
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!e verbal comprehension module is encapsulated and, during its computations, 
it has limited access to background information. However, this module is flexible 
enough to reflect the changes that the interpretation of every element in the 
u"erance brings into the context of interpretation of the following elements. !is 
means that the relevance comprehension procedure does not have to wait until the 
end of the u"erance to bring as new input the output resulting from the 
computations of other modules. !is information will be brought into the processing 
as soon as possible in such a way that the results obtained a%er processing the first 
constituents will act inhibiting those analysis of the following constituents which are 
incompatible with them. Or, as in the previous example, this information will serve 
to reveal inconsistencies in the resulting propositional form which need to be re-
analysed.17!is is how these new assumptions will become part of the context of 
processing to make available a second interpretation and force the reader to discard 
the one initially recovered.
!e resolution of reference assignment in the process of identification of the 
propositional form of the u"erance goes along similar lines. !e relevance-based 
inferential procedure will consider hypothetical referent in order of accessibility and 
will automatically select the first one that, being the least effort demanding, provides 
an interpretation that satisfies expectations of relevance. In the following 
advertisement, the picture presents a beautiful, very large mansion in the country 
and, right in front of it, a car. !e advertisement says:
(7)   !e Definitive Country Estate.
   Subaru Legacy 2.2 GX 4WD.
    Best Estate Car What car? Cars of the Year Awards 1990.
SUBARU (News of the World, March 1990)
!e picture, which is also an ostensive stimulus, brings to the reader’s a"ention a 
magnificent country house, an estate, which besides influencing the disambiguation 
process of the word estate also makes highly accessible a referent for the noun phrase 
in the u"erance: 
(8)  !e definitive country estate is the landed property with the magnificent mansion
  we see in the picture.
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17 See Just & Carpenter (1980, 1992) who present the immediacy assumption in written 
language processing, that postulates that the subject tries to interpret every content word as 
soon as he meets it and at all levels of processing. Iza & Esquerra (2000) argue that the 
explanation of how the human processing system could be so powerful to perform so many 
inferences in so little time, in spite of having such a limited processing capacity, depends on 
the kind of representational architecture we assume the human cognitive system has. 
!e relevance-based comprehension procedure will perform both sub-tasks, 
disambiguation and reference assignment, drawing reflexive, spontaneous 
inferences on the basis of the saliency of a sense (estate-property) and a referent (the 
mansion in the picture) in the set of contextual assumptions immediately accessible 
for the system to perform its computations.
As in the example previously analysed, when the processor reaches the second 
part of the text, new assumptions are activated from the general database and 
integrated into the temporarily-existing database of the module. !ese assumptions, 
which among others are about the make and type of car advertised, a Subaru Legacy, 
an estate car, will contribute to revealing the mistake in the interpretation initially 
constructed. !e relevance-based procedure will reprocess the u"erance, 
performing new automatic inferences to disambiguate the ambiguous lexical item 
and assign reference to the noun phrase and thus, recover a second interpretation 
that justifies the reader’s expectations of relevance:
(9)  !e definitive country estate is the Subaru Legacy 2.2 car in the advertisement.
!is advantageous use of reflexive inference making can also be observed in cases 
in which the linguistic form of the u"erance sets up a slot, physically marked by an 
element in the u"erance or not, which must be inferentially filled for the 
propositional form to be recovered, a process known as saturation (Carston 2000: 15). 
Consider the following advertisement:
(10) Over the last five years we’ve helped millions to emigrate to Europe
  Merrill Lynch           ("e Economist, November 1993)
!e incomplete semantic representation of this u"erance includes a slot to be 
filled, millions of what?, that has to be contextually supplied for the addressee to 
recover the truth-conditional content, that is, the complete propositional form of the 
u"erance. Once again the advertiser can control the contextual assumptions that will 
become highly accessible for the addressee and so will be selected to be part of the 
temporarily-existing database that the module will use in its computations. !e word 
emigrate will activate the piece of knowledge “it is people who emigrate” which will 
provide the module with a relevant option to fill the slot in a fast, frugal way, via a 
reflexive inference:
(11)  Over the last five years we’ve helped millions [of people] to emigrate to Europe.
Next, the reader processes the second part of the advertisement where the name 
of the company appears, and he assigns reference to the pronoun we in an automatic 
way, as Merrill Lynch will be the most accessible and relevant referent in the context. 
Processing continues with the small print in the ad at the same time as new 
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contextual assumptions are made available in a very dynamic, context-sensitive way: 
for instance, information about Merril Flynch, which is a leading financial 
management and advisory company, and from this, the knowledge that financial 
companies deal with money, and not people. !e small print also informs the reader 
that Merril Flynch want to advertise their contribution to the flow of investment 
capital from US to Europe. !ese new pieces of information will come into play in the 
processing and will signal the mistake in the initial selection, offering, by making it 
very salient, a second possibility of recovering the right propositional form through 
a reflexive, automatic relevance-guided inference:
(12)  Over the last five years we’ve helped millions [of US dollars] to emigrate to Europe.
Advertisers also make use of the human natural tendency to draw reflexive 
inferences in verbal comprehension in advertisements that include some u"erance 
that expresses a complete semantic representation but need some kind of pragmatic 
adjustment and enrichment if we are to say that we understood what the speaker 
meant to communicate. If we consider the following example:
(13) Drop everything. Previews begin Monday, Sept. 25.
  "e Full Monty. !e Broadway Musical   (New York Times, September. 200018)
In the development of the propositional form of this example the addressee will 
have to perform a combination of disambiguation, for the sense of drop intended by 
the speaker, and enrichment, for the specific meaning of everything that has to be 
determined contextually. !e picture accompanying the text reproduces the famous 
scene of the play, in which the group of unemployed steel workers who have 
prepared a strip act are just about to do the full monty: the image shows their six 
naked legs in a row while they are holding a police cap hiding their nudity. 
Obviously, this is a good eye-catching stimulus which is very likely to a"ract the 
reader’s a"ention and that will activate a specific set of assumptions that will be used 
a context in the development of a first propositional form for the first of the 
u"erances in the ad:
 
(14)  Let the police caps fall.
In this initial interpretation drop will be disambiguated as meaning let fall by 
releasing, and the selection of this sense will also influence the way in which the 
meaning of everything is pragmatically enriched. In this case, the domain of the 
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18  Example taken from <http://www.adflip.com>.
quantifier everything must be contextually inferred thereby narrowing down the 
interpretation to let the caps fall19 .
When the addressee processes the rest of the advertisement, as in the examples 
previously analysed, new assumptions are activated and become part of a renewed 
and extended context which prompts the construction of a second, immediately 
accessible interpretation. Now drop is understood as leave unfinished and everything is 
narrowed down to mean whatever you are doing at this moment:
(15)  Leave anything you are doing right now.
!ese four cases we have analysed are all instances of garden-path u"erances, 
that is, u"erances in which the interpretation initially constructed by the reader 
soon has to be abandoned and replaced by a second interpretation. In all these 
examples the recovery of an initial mistaken interpretation has to do with the 
selection of the wrong semantic representation and its development into the wrong 
propositional form as well. !e mistake that relevance-based procedure makes in the 
interpretation process can be explained in terms of the inferences it draws, heuristic 
and so reflexive, and the specific assumptions in the limited database it has at its 
disposal to perform those computations. 
Another factor that contributes to the module spontaneously deriving the wrong 
inferences is the lack of certain items of background information necessary for 
process to be carried out in an efficient and relevant way. !ose pieces of knowledge 
could be absent from the database of the module for two main reasons. It could be 
because the processor has not acquired them previously and consequently, as they 
are not in the general database, they cannot be activated and used in the process. In 
this case, the necessary assumptions will be made accessible to the processor in the 
ostensive stimulus itself, that is, in the advertisement, but late enough in the process 
for the module to have already selected an initial, mistaken interpretation. For 
instance, in the Merril Lynch advertisement the addressee has to read the small print 
to be able to understand fully what the advertiser intends to communicate. Or it 
could be that these assumptions are already in the general background knowledge 
database of the processor, but their saliency or accessibility has not been increased 
on purpose so that they could not be used in the interpretative process soon enough 
to avoid constructing an interpretation that has to be abandoned later.
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19 The process of narrowing (also called enrichment or strengthening) of a lexically encoded 
concept is one of the possibilities within ad hoc concept construction. According to Carston 
(1996), in cases of narrowing “there is a subset relation between the extension of the concept 
actually communicated in these examples and the extension of the lexical concept from 
which it has been derived […].” (3). Another variety in ad hoc concept construction is the 
process of loosening (also called broadening or weakening). For a detailed analysis of how 
these processes contribute differently to the proposition expressed by the utterance and the 
problems of explanation they pose see Carston (1996, 2000)
7 Reflexive inferences and cognitive effects
In the previous section we have analysed a number of advertisements and explained 
how reflexive inferences are responsible for the recovery of the wrong propositional 
form and how reflexive inferences are also involved in the recovery of a second line 
of interpretation. In what follows we want to develop an explanation of the reasons 
that make the reader decide that the interpretation initially developed is mistaken 
and should be abandoned and replaced by a more relevant interpretation.
According to Sperber & Wilson (2002) the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
procedure will follow a path of least effort when processing an u"erance and will 
stop when its expectations of relevance are satisfied. When does that happen? Well, 
for an u"erance to be optimally relevant on a given interpretation it must produce a 
number of positive cognitive effects, that is, improvements or changes in the 
individual’s representation of the world due to the interaction of the newly 
presented information with the set of existing assumptions. !is interaction could be 
of three kinds: a) it could serve to strengthen an existing assumption, b) it could 
contradict and eliminate an existing assumption, or c) the new assumption could 
combine with an existing assumption to derive a contextual implication, that is, “a 
conclusion deducible from input and context together, but from neither input nor 
context alone” (Wilson & Sperber, 2004: 608).
U"erances are ostensive stimuli and, as such, they come with a guarantee of their 
optimal relevance. If an u"erance, on a given interpretation, fails to produce positive 
cognitive effects, that is, it fails to interact with the context of interpretation in one 
of the three ways above, then the reader will search for those effects in another 
direction: either by deriving a second propositional form (as in the previous 
examples) and/or extending the context so that some relevant implications can be 
derived. !e following advertisement for the consumption of milk is very 
illustrative. In the picture we can see a very beautiful girl posing, dressed in very 
smart, fashionable clothes. Her upper lip is stained with milk, as if she had just 
drank from the glass she is holding in her hand. !e text, right next to her face, says:
(16) Model behaviour.             (Vanity Fair, May 2001)20
!e relevance comprehension procedure, in an automatic fashion, will develop 
the following interpretation for this u"erance:
(17) Having dirty lips a%er drinking milk is the kind of behaviour to imitate.
!e addressee will find it difficult to combine this information with existing 
assumptions in the context of interpretation to derive new contextual implications. 
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20  Advertisement taken from <http://www.adflip.com> [20-11-2009] .
Probably, one of the beliefs the reader holds very strongly is that we should dry our 
lips a%er drinking, and not leave them stained, which is not a very nice behaviour. 
!e u"erance, on that interpretation, is not relevant in the context available because, 
although it contradicts an assumption in it, it does not manage to eliminate it 
because this is held with a very high degree of strength. 
!e reader will then continue processing the advertisement, guided by these 
expectations of relevance created in him by the ostensive stimulus and the cognitive 
need to find an interpretation that compensates the processing effort involved with 
positive cognitive benefits. In the rest of the advertisement, the necessary 
assumptions to complete the interpretative process are supplied. !e reader will 
process the small print and the communicated assumptions will become accessible to 
the module to be used as contextual assumptions to complete the interpretative 
process:
(18) Model behaviour.
Want strong bones? Your bones grow until about age 35 and the calcium in milk helps. 
A%er that, it helps keep them strong. Which means milk is always in fashion. 
GOT MILK? (Dairy Farmers)
 
In the light of this new extended context, the reader will re-interpret the first 
u"erance and, again through a reflexive inference process, will develop a second 
propositional form for the u"erance:
 
(19) Drinking milk is an example of ideal, perfect behaviour to imitate.
Now, the relevance theoretic processor can combine the developed interpretation 
with the set of background contextual assumptions available to the procedure and 
derive the adequate set of positive cognitive effects that will fulfill the expectations 
of relevance created by the ostensive stimulus.
In summary, the interpretation initially constructed in these cases is soon 
abandoned because it fails to provide the adequate contextual effects to compensate 
for the effort employed in the process, failing in this way to provide an interpretation 
that justifies the reader’s expectations of relevance. !e processing will continue 
until a relevant interpretation is found, an interpretation that interacts with the 
reader’s cognitive environment, improving it or changing it in some way intended by 
the speaker.
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Conclusion
We have analysed a number of advertisements which clearly illustrate how 
advertisers, taking advantage of the knowledge about the functioning of the human 
cognitive system, can develop their adverts in specific ways that will secure a 
particular processing activity on the part of the reader. One of the strategies widely 
employed makes use of the mechanism of spontaneous, reflexive inferencing which 
is involved in much of the processing in verbal communication. 
Inferences play two major roles in interpretation. Firstly they serve to fill in gaps 
in the process of recovery of the propositional form of the u"erances. And secondly, 
they play an essential role in elaborating the structure, that is, in making the 
necessary connections and combinations with contextual information, to derive new 
assumptions or contextual implications. Both processes, mostly carried out by means 
of heuristics, can be carefully calculated and planned by advertisers, so that readers 
go through a specific interpretation procedure in which different interpretations are 
recovered in a pre-planned sequence, and different assumptions are activated or 
acquired in a very skilfully premeditated way. 
All these cases are characterised by a number of features. First, the advertiser has 
carefully chosen the verbal and non-verbal stimuli so that they capture the 
addressee’s a"ention and have a good probability of activating the modules involved 
in their processing. Second, the advertiser has carefully decided which concepts 
these stimuli will contain and/or give access to, as they will serve to activate specific 
assumptions that will become part of the context of interpretation and play a 
fundamental role in the recovery of a given interpretation. !ird, a knowledge of the 
human cognitive system and the way in which we represent and later access 
information allows the advertiser to calculate which pieces of knowledge are or will 
be highly salient in the addressee’s mind at the time of the processing, because they 
have been recently processed, or because they enjoy of a special saliency due to social 
or cultural reasons. Fourth, the advertiser can also calculate which items of 
knowledge or set of assumptions are frequently processed together, and can be 
treated as a pack of background knowledge that the module can bring momentarily 
into its database as a whole. Fi%h, a knowledge of how the verbal comprehension 
sub-module works allows the advertiser to foresee the sequence in which the 
different assumptions are likely to become available for the addressee. !e 
processing system operates very quickly, using the interpretation of preceding 
elements as context to process new elements, and integrating the output from other 
modules in a very fast, dynamic fashion. Knowing the system works in this way gives 
the advertiser the possibility to calculate and plan in advance the temporal flow of 
the interpretative process. 
In summary, a consideration of the previous elements makes it possible for the 
advertiser to expect that the interpretation procedure applied by the verbal 
comprehension sub-module to his ostensive stimulus will develop along the 
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intended lines. !e inferential mechanisms of the verbal comprehension system 
have evolved to react quickly and effortless to the stimuli that activate them. !us, 
the relevance-based inferential procedure, working in a fashion that enhances 
cognitive efficiency, is a fast and frugal heuristic that functions drawing reflexive, 
spontaneous inferences when processing specific data, inferences that produce the 
right conclusions on most occasions and that can be used, in cases like the ones 
discussed to achieved the intended interpretative effects.
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